Department of Defense [DOD]
"In his September 16, 2019. letter to the research community. Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), described a new OSTP-led interagency Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE).
DoD is an active participant in JCORE, and in its sub-committee on Research Security, which is initially focused on coordinating four lines of Federal effort:
- coordinating outreach and engagement
- disclosure requirements for participation in federally funded research
- best practices for academic research institutions
- methods for identification, assessment, and management of risk
This work will help agencies that fund Federal research to develop common standards for identifying and adjudicating conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment from these disclosures. It will also help agencies that fund Federal research to clarify consequences for failing to make these disclosures."
“The National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA) for FY 2019, Section 1286, pages 443- 445, directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an initiative to work with academic institutions who perform defense research and engineering activities: 1. To support protection of intellectual property, controlled information, key personnel, and information about critical technologies relevant to national security; and 2. To limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit United States technology within the Department of Defense research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise.”
Effective immediately, unless an exception applies or a waiver is granted, contracting officers shall not enter into or renew a contract for the procurement of—
- An unmanned aircraft system (UAS), or any related services or equipment, that—
- Is manufactured in the People’s Republic of China or by an entity domiciled in the People’s Republic of China;
- Uses flight controllers, radios, data transmission devices, cameras, or gimbals manufactured in the People’s Republic of China or by an entity domiciled in the People’s Republic of China;
- Uses a ground control system or operating software developed in the People’s Republic of China or by an entity domiciled in the People’s Republic of China; or
- Uses network connectivity or data storage located in, or administered by an entity domiciled in, the People’s Republic of China; or
- A system for the detection or identification of a UAS, or any related services or equipment, that is manufactured—
- In the People’s Republic of China; or
- By an entity domiciled in the People’s Republic of China.
This prohibition does not apply to procurements for the purposes of: counter-UAS surrogate testing and training; or intelligence, electronic warfare, and information warfare operations, testing, analysis, and training.
This class deviation implements the procurement prohibition under section 848 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Pub. L. 116-92).
|What to Disclose||Where to Disclose||When to Disclose|
|Outside Appointments, both paid and unpaid||Biosketch||Proposal|
|Related sources of support||Other Support||Proposal|
|Outside professional activities, including financial interests received from a foreign entity. This requirement is distinct and in addition to the reporting of other support and foreign components to the NIH.||UNM conflict of interest in research disclosure.||at the time of the proposal submission, annually, and/or within 30 days of any material changes, acquiring new interest/s, or commencing new activity that merits disclosure.|